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I. Introduction
Recently, market stabilization has become an important issue in the
controversy over establishing reserve stocks of grains. W. W. Cochrane
[1] has strongly urged the establishment of buffer stocks of agricultural
products to help stabilize prices. However, Cochrane and many others who
advocate the establishment of buffer stocks for stabilizing prices do not
justify their positions from a theoretical point of view. It seems that
their objective function is the stabilization of prices as a goal in itself.
On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view and using conventional
consumer and producer surplus analysis, B. F. Massell [2] integrated some
previous results obtained by F. V. Waugh [61 [7] and by W. Oi [4] to show that,
from the social point of view, a buffer stock which stabilizes prices is
beneficial when compared to a free market situation. Similar results are
obtained by Turnovsky [5] who analyzes the welfare implications of price
stabilization under different assumptions concerning the behavior of supply.
*The authors are members of the Faculty of Industrial and Management
Engineering at Technion--Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel and
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota,
respectively. This paper was written during the period July-October 1974
while the senior author was a Visiting Associate Professor at the University
of Minnesota.-2-
Therefore, it may be concluded that the advocates for the establish-
ment of buffer stocks which stabilize prices can justify their positions
from a theoretical point of view. But if price stabilization is justified
in terms of social welfare, might it also be the case that stabilizing
other market variables will be even more beneficial than stable prices?
In other words, if maximizing social welfare is the objective of the policy
maker, there is no a-priori reason why stabilizing the quantities demanded
or the quantity supplied should not be considered as possible alternatives
to price stabilization.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the welfare implications
of stabilizing consumption and production and to compare it with the
already-known welfare implications of stabilizing prices. Two sets of
assumptions regarding supply behavior will be considered: (1) supply
reacts instantaneously to a change in market prices, (2) producers react
to changes in expected prices and expectations are “rational” within the
context developed by J. F. Muth. [3] As a by-product of the analysis, the
relation between the gains of stabilization and the size of the buffer
stocks necessary to achieve the stabilizing goal at given probability levels
also will be shown. Finally, the analysis will be extended to cover instability
due to fluctuations in export demand.
II. Method of Analysis
The basic behavioral model which will be analyzed for the different
stabilizing schemes is:




where D and S are the quantities demanded and supplied, P is the market price-3-
and u and v are the random elements affecting demand and supply. It iS
assumed that the error terms are independent and have finite variances,
o’ 2 and (S . In the absence of any stabilizing intervention, the u v
market is assumed to behave competitively.
The free market solution of system (1) is:
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The effects of any stabilizing scheme on consumers and producers will
be measured in terms of consumers and producers surplus as compared to free
market behavior. The drawbacks of measuring welfare gain or loss by means
of various areas associated with demand and supply functions are well known
and have been dealt with extensively elsewhere. Those arguments will not
be repeated here but should
measures.
The areas representing
losses) will be obtained as
be kept in mind in any application of these
the consumers and producers surplus (gains or
follows: Let Pe be the free market equilibrium
price and let Ps be the market price under any of the stabilization schemes
considered. Similarly, let De and Se be the free market equilibrium
demand and supply respectively (D = Se = e
be the demand and supply respectively for
considered. It follows that the consumer
stabilizing scheme will be measured as:
Qe); also, let D(Ps) and S(Ps)
any of the stabilization schemes
gains (or losses) due to any
Pe
(3) G = {Pe D(P)dP = f (a. - alP)dP = %(Pe - Ps)(De + Ds)
c s Ps-4-
Similarly, the producers gains (or losses) will be measured as:
Ps
(4) Gs=j S(P)dP = f p~s (~o+ 61P)dP = %(PS - Pe)(s~ + se)
Pe
The total gain or losses from any stabilizing scheme will be:
(5) G=G+G c s“
The levels at which the various market variables (price, quantity
demanded, and quantity supplied) are stabilized correspond to their
expected values which would have been obtained from the free market system.
In other words, stabilization is aimed at eliminating the free market
randomness in the variable which is being stabilized.
Since the welfare gains (or losses) as measured in (3), (4) and (5)
relate stabilization to free market situations which are affected by
random elements, these measured gains (or losses) are themselves random.
Therefore, we will be comparing the expected values of the welfare gains
(or losses) derived from the different stabilization schemes.
The reason for dealing with a static model as in (1) is only a matter
of convenience. The addition of demand and supply shifters will not change
the nature of most of the results obtained. Whenever a changing stabilized
variable through time will have an impact on the derived results, this
possibility will be mentioned and analyzed.
111. Stabilizing Schemes When Supply
Reacts Instantaneously to a Change
In Market Price
Price Stabilization
The welfare implications of price stabilization in this case have
been analyzed by Massell and Turnovsky. [2] [5] Nevertheless, their-5-
analyses are restated here to provide a basis for comparison between the
different stabilization schemes.
Price is stabilized at the expected free market price, namely:
a
(6) P~ = ~;;;” =~
1
At that price, the quantities demanded and supplied are:
(7)
a. (31 + al 130
s(Ps)t = + Vt
al + %
It follows that when price is stabilized at ~, government will be
buying or selling stocks according to:
(8) AGt(~ = S(Ps)t -D(Ps)t = Vt - Ut
This scheme may be analyzed graphically, figure 1.
When demand is unstable and it is equally likely that D will shift
to either Dl or D2, the expected gain in consumers welfare is positive and
measured by the area of ABCD-DJFG. Similarly, the expected loss in
producers surplus is measured by the area of ABJD-DJFG. It follows that
the social gains is measured by the area of BCJ -tEJF.
If supply is unstable and it is equally likely that S will shift to
either S1 or S2, the loss in consumer welfare is measured by the area of
DCEF-ABCD. The gain in producers surplus will be measured as the area of
DGEF-ABDH. Social gains will be measured as the area of CGE + HBC.
Using the analytical approach introduced in section II, we obtain the
following results involving the expected gains (or losses) derived by
consumers, producers, and society when market prices are stabilized:Fl@JRE1:
-6-
Q a-7-
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These results have already appeared and been discussed in the cited
literature. We will return to these results in a latter stage when they
will be compared to alternative stabilization schemes.
However, there is one further result which is worth mentioning
for future reference. Let u2(~) be the variance of the changes in
government stocks due to a price stabilizing scheme. From (8) we obtain:
(s2(5=:a:+ 0:
It follows that the relation between the variance of the change in govern-




Stabilization of Consumer Demand
To carry out this scheme, the quantity demanded is stabilized by
government intervention at:
a %. +a.0
(12) Ds = 0 “L
L“o
al 6 +1
If the quantity clemanded
the market price and the
is stabilized at Ds,
change in government
then the quantity supplied,
stocks become:-8-
Cxo (31
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(14) P(D~)t = 0 + 1 — (Ut)
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to behave as in
is immaterial whether the target level of
of time or not. All that is needed is for
(15). We may get a clearer notion of the
workings of this scheme by using some graphic analysis, figure 2.
Let demand be unstable and assume that a shift to D1 is as likely to
happen as a shift to D2. If D1 occurs, the free market solution would be
at C, figure 2(a). Here the quantity demanded is bigger than the target
quantity, Ds. The government would buy EB of stocks, driving the market
price up to E. Similarly, if D2 occurred, the free market solution would
be at G, figure 2(a). Here the quantity demanded is smaller than the tar-
get. The government would sell the amount of JH, driving the market price
down to H. Therefore, if the source of instability is in demand, the
stabilization of the quantity demanded will destabilize market price.
Clearly this should be detrimental to consumers as a group since they are
not allowed to adjust consumption when the range of price variability
increases. In terms of figure 2(a), consumers expected losses are measured
by the area AECD-l?GHI. Similarly, since producers are allowed to adjust
production, they will take advantage of the increased price variability
and benefit from consumption stabilization. In terms of figure 2(a), these
expected benefits are measured by the area ABCD-FGIJ. The expected total
































In figure 2(b) we can see the workings of a consumption stabilization
scheme when the source of instability is in supply. If S1 occurs, the
free market solution would be at B where the quantity demanded is smaller
than the target, D . The government then will sell EC stocks, driving the s
price down to ~. Notice that ~ is the stabilized price when a price
stabilization scheme is in effect. If S2 occurs, the free market solution
would be at F. The government will buy CG stocks in order to decrease
consumption to the target level. The additional government purchases will
.
raise prices to P. As a result, the expected welfare loss by consumers is
measured as the area of DCFH-ABCD while the expected gains by producers are
measured as the area of DGFH-ABDE. In total, when supply is unstable,
expected social gains are measured by the area of CGF + BCE.
Using the methodology of Section II, the algebraic expressions for the
expected welfare implications of stabilizing consumption are:
(16) EGC (D9) = -1
Zal(al + B1)2 (812 UU2+Q12 UV2)
2a1 + 61
(17) EGs (D9) = (612 UU2 + a12 UV2)
2a12 (al + /$)2
(18) EG (Ds) = 1
(612 uu2 + a12 UV2)
2a12 (al + $1)
As compared to the welfare effects for consumers when
consumers do not benefit from demand instability when
is stabilized. On the other hand, demand instability
producers when the quantity demanded is stabilized, but is detrimental to




The reason that consumers do not benefit from demand instability when
consumption is stabilized as compared to when price is stabilized can be
explained as follows. When demand is unstable, a relatively high free
market equilibrium price will be the result of a relatively large quantity
demanded. On the other hand, a relatively low free market equilibrium
price will be the result of a relatively small quantity demanded. When
the free market equilibrium price is relatively high but price is stabilized,
the government sells stocks to drive the market price down. This induces
an increase in the quantity demanded. Since the quantity demanded was large
to begin with, consumer gains will be relatively large. Alternatively, when
free market prices are relatively low, price stabilization will involve an
increase in prices and a decline in the quantity demanded. This yields a
welfare loss to consumers. But since consumption was small to begin with,
the loss also will be relatively small.
When consumption is stabilized, just the opposite happens. At a high
free market equilibrium price and a relatively large quantity demanded, the
government drives the market price up further by buying stocks inducing a
decline in demand and a loss for consumers. This loss is relatively big
since the quantity demanded was large to begin with. On the other hand,
when the free market equilibrium price is relatively low and the quantity
demanded small, by stabilizing consumption government will sell stocks to
stabilize consumption, driving the price down. As a result, consumers gain,
but this gain will be relatively small.
Producers gain from demand instability when consumption is stabilized,
but they lose when price is stabilized. This occurs because producers are
better off when allowed to produce at random along a given supply function-12-
than to produce the expected quantity at the expected price. When supply
is the only source of instability, the stabilization of consumption gives





should be noted that when demand is unstable, the government will
expected deficit. It can be shown that theextent of this expected
61 is measured by ~ u: . It would be tempting to subtract this
al
J.
from the expected social gains to arrive at a
expected gains. In our view, this
any real life application in which
through time because of systematic
is that, while the expected budget
objective conditions at that time,






shifts in demand and supply. The reason
loss at any given time is related to the
the budget situation, unlike the benefits
on previous constellations of equilibrium
prices and quantities. Without all this previous data, it is impossible
to integrate the budgetary aspects
also be mentioned that, because of
scheme only seems to be
application. We therefore confine
of the stabilization schemes. It should
even
the above reasons,/a price stabilization
budgetarily neutral in any real life
this discussion only to the welfare
implications of the different stabilizing schemes without considering their
budgetary implications.
Before turning to the next scheme, we shall relate the expected social
benefits from consumption stabilization to the variance of the changes in
government stocks. Let ff2(Ds)be the variance of the changes in government
stocks when consumption is stabilized. Then from (15)-13-





For this scheme, stabilization is achieved at the expected free market
equilibrium supply. Government buys and sells stocks in such a way that
the target supply will be forthcoming
a. 61 + al 60
(19) s =
s al + ‘1
At that level of supply, the quantity







to the market. The target supply is:
demanded, the market price and the
al +— + Ut
% ‘t
‘1 a - 130
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(22) al AG(Ss)t = - (~
1
In a real world application of




this scheme, it is enough that government
achieve supply stabilization.
Before we present the analytical and welfare results for this scheme,
a graphical presentation may be helpful, figure 3.
When only demand is unstable and a shift to either D1 or D2 is
equally likely to happen, stabilizing supply has the same effects as












observe that if D1 occurs, the free market solution
is larger than the target Ss. Government will sell
the market price in order to decrease production to
is at B. Here supply
stocks thereby reducing
the
Similarly, the free market solution with X)2would be at
is smaller than the target. Government will buy stocks
prices so as to induce producers to increase production
target level.
H where production
in order to increase
up to the desired
level. The result is an expected loss of producers surplus measured by the
area of ABDG-DGHI and a gain in expected consumer surplus measured by the
area ABCD-DJIH. When only demand is unstable, the overall expected social
gains are measured by BCG + GHJ.
The workings of supply stabilizationwhen there is a random element
affecting the supply function is shown in figure 3(b). The free market
solution with S1 would be at B where supply is too small. The government
would then buy DC stocks to bring about a price increase to C which in turn
stimulates an increase in supply to the desired target level.
Similarly, the free market solution with S2 would be at G where supply
is larger then the target. The government then would sell HI stocks, reducing
price to H. At H producers will supply the target quantity S9. As a result
producers will suffer an expected loss measured by the area FGHJ-ECAB while
consumers will gain an expected surplus measured by the area FGIJ-ABED. In
total, when only supply is unstable, the expected social gains are measured
by the area BCD + GHI.
The expected gains and losses resulting from a supply stabilizing
scheme are summarized as follows:
(261 +a1) ‘2 2 2 2
(23) EGC(S) =
26: (al + 81)2 1
al ‘v + ‘1 ‘u1-16-
(24)
(25)
Unlike the price stabilizing scheme, supply instability is beneficial
for consumers when the amount supplied
consumers are better off if allowed to
than if they are forced to consume the
price.
is stabilized. The reason is that
move freely on a given demand function
expected quantity at the expected
Also, unlike the price stabilizing scheme, supply schedule instability
is detrimental to producers when the amount supplied is stabilized. In this
case, government actions destabilized market prices as compared with the
free market prices. In other words, when free market prices would have
been relatively high, production stabilizationmakes them even higher,
causing an increase in production. If free market prices would have been
low, production stabilizationmakes them lower still, inducing a decline
in production. Yet when prices are relatively high, free market production
is relatively low and when prices are relatively low, free market production
is relatively high. Therefore, any gains derived from an increased produc-




production at relatively low prices.
this with price stabilization. When prices are stabilized
unstable, just the opposite happens. If free market equili-
brium prices are high, government sells stocks inducing a decline In price
and a decreased production. But since equilibrium production is small,
at the relatively high prices, the loss incurred by decreasing production-17-
is relatively small. By the same reasoning, when the free market equilibrium
prices are relatively low, government buys stocks to increase prices and
thereby production. Since this occurs when production is relatively high,
the gains derived by the increased production are high.
It also should be noticed that if the only source of instability is in
demand, stabilizing the quantity supplied will result in the same behavior
as when prices are stabilized.
Similar to the consumption stabilization scheme, a supply stabilization
al
scheme seems to indicate an expected budgetary deficit measured as ~ 02 v“
%
For the reasons already stated, we will abstract from this aspect of the
stabilizing schemes.
For future reference, we show the relation between the expected gains
from consumption stabilization and the variance of the changes in government
stocks [U2(SS)]. From (22) we get:
22 22









Summary of Stabilization Schemes
Three stabilization schemes have been analyzed under
that supply reacts instantaneously to a change in price.
the assumption
The welfare impli-
cations of the different schemes for consumers, producers, and society as a
whole have been shown. These welfare implications do not depend on whether
the system is static or whether equilibrium solutions change through time.-18-
The expected welfare gains at every point of time are independent. On the
other hand the budgetary implications of the different schemes cannot be
analyzed in the context of static models. They depend on the time path of
the equilibrium values of prices and quantities. Consequently, we abstract
from any budgetary considerationswhen we compare the stabilizing schemes.
In terms of the expected social benefits of the schemes that were
analyzed, the following conclusions can be drawn:
(a) If al > 131:
EG(S~) > EG(P~) > EG(DG)
(b) If 131 >al:
EG(DS) > EG(PS) > EG(Ss)
These results have a cost counterpart measured by the stocks needed
by the government in order to carry out the different stabilizing schemes.
Using the Central Limit Theorem of statistics, we may assume that the needed
changes in government stocks are approximately normally distributed.(This
assumption becomes more realistic, the larger the model and the more sources
of instability are built into the system.)
effective in 95% of all possible cases, the
1.96 times the variance of stocks indicated
It follows that in order to be
government would need to hold
under any particular scheme.
If a cost function for carrying stocks is known, then a price tag could be
attached to each of the stabilizing schemes. But even if such cost functions
are not known, our analysis at least enables us to rank the different schemes
according to their relative costs. These relative costs are directly related
to the size of the variance in government stocks associated with the different
schemes. We have shown that for every stabilizing scheme the variance of-19-
the change in government stocks is proportional to expected social gains.
Moreover, the proportionality coefficient is equal for all of the stabilizing
schemes. So it follows that:
(a) If al > 131:
02(ss) > a2(P~) > cr2(D~)
(b) If 61 >Ul:
u2(D~) > u2(Ps) > U2(SS)
In
in
other words, the more beneficial the scheme, the higher the costs involved
affecting that scheme.
IV. Stabilizing Schemes Which Assume
Rational Expectations
The assumption that supply reacts instantaneously to price changes is
not a realistic assumption for many agricultural production processes.
Characteristically once the level of production has been decided, changing
market conditions will have little if any bearing on the actual quantity
supplied.
Therefore, the quantity supplied in any marketing period will not depend
on current price but on expected price as visualized by producers at the
time their production decision is made. It follows that the basic model
which now will be analyzed for the different stabilizing schemes is:
D(Pt) = a. - al Pt + Ut
(28)
S(P;) = f30+ 131P:+vt-20-
*
where P~ is the expected price as visualized by producers at the time
when the production decision for the marketing period t is made.
It will be assumed that price expectations are “rational” as Muth
defines the term. [3] This means that producers decide on output
according to the expected equilibrium price that would be obtained from





In the absence of any stabilizing intervention, the competitive market
solutions when producers expectations are rational is as follows:
(30)
ao -B
Pe = o + ‘t - ‘t
al + 61 al
a. (31
Qe =
+ al ‘o + “
a. + B. t
The expected gains and losses from the different stabilizing schemes will
then be obtained following the same procedure as used in Section 11. In
the following discussion of the different stabilizing schemes, attention
will be given only to those results which are qualitatively different from
those already obtained.
Price Stabilization




As price is stabilized at P the market quantities demanded and s’
supplied, and the change in government stocks are:
a. 131 + al 80
D(Ps)t = + Ut
al + ~1
a. 131 + al 60
(32) s(P~)t = + Vt
al + ‘1
AGt(P~) = Vt - Ut
When these solutions are compared to the free market solution, the expected












Technically these results differ from those presented in (9), (10) and (11)
only to the extent that ~1 = o. Quantitatively, the difference is




function because of random shifts
supply reacted instantaneously to
shown in figure 4.
When only demand is unstable and D1
in demand as was
a price change.
the case when the
Graphically, this
and D2 are equally likely, then the
free market solutions would be at B and E. With no price stabilization, the































CDEF. Since on the average they do not lose or gain with a free market
situation, it follows that by stabilizing price ‘atPs they also do not
lose or gain.
a
As in the previous case, there is/simple relation between the expected
social gains and the variance of the changes in government stocks, u2(P~).
Since a2 a2(P8) = ~ + u:
it follows that:
(36) EG(PS) = &- u2(P~) l
1
Stabilization of Consumer Demand
The quantity demanded is stabilized at the’expected free market
equilibrium as follows:
a. f31 +- al 130
(37) Ds =
al + ‘1
The stabilization of consumer demand implies that the market price, the
quantity supplied, and the changes in government stocks will be as follows:
P(l)a)t =
a - f30 o 1 +—
al + % al
‘t
a. t31 -+ al 130
(38) S(Da)t = +V
al + f31 t
AG(Ds)t = vt
Notice that the government will buy or sell stocks to stabilize consumer
demand only if supply is unstable.-24-
The stabilization of consumer demand will generate the following
expected gains:
(39) EGC (D~) = ~
1
(40) EG~ (D~) = *
al






Clearly, these results are the same as those in (16), (17) and (18) when
@l = 0“ The gains now are independent of demand instability. We have
already discussed the reason for the independence of producers’ gains
from demand instability. The reason for the independence of consumer
gains from demand instability remains to be shown.
In figure 5, A and B are free market equilibrium solutions for Dl
and D2 respectively when rational expectations apply. Such solutions do
not require the intervention of the government in order to satisfy the
consumption target. Therefore, when consumption is stablized and only
demand is unstable, the free market solution will be the same as the
stabilized solution. Since the solutions are the same, it follows that
demand instability will have no effect on consumer welfare.
Unlike the case in which demand was stabilized and supply reacted
instantaneously to a change in price, now there will be no expected deficit
in the government budget.
The variance of the change in government stocks is:
(42) (s2(Ds)= 02 v-25-
P
B







(43) EG(D~) = ~ u2(D~).
1
Supply Stabilization
The supply target is set at:
a. f31
(44) s~ = + al ‘o
al + ~1
Clearly, once producers have decided the level of production, supply
will depend only on that level of production and on the random elements
affecting supply. It follows that when supply is stabilized and expecta-
tions are rational, government will have to buy and sell stocks according
to total quantity supplied. But the price at which purchases and sales are
made will depend on the supply target. We will return to this point later
when a graphical analysis of this stabilizing scheme is presented.
When the supply target is set at S the market quantities demanded s’











al + 81 ‘1
Cxo @l + al i30
+ Vt
al + @l
ao -e o 1 .—
al + ‘1 @l ‘c
(1 -
al
~) Vt - Ut-27-
The expected gains generated by this scheme are:
A
(47) EGs(Ss) =
61 - al ~2
al ‘1 v
(48) EG(Ss) = ~
1
A better understanding of
1 .:+(1+’ 0’] v
these analytical results may be gained by
tracing out geometrically the effects of demand and supply instability
on the measures of social welfare.
In figure 6 we examine only the effects of unstable demand. The supply
target is satisfied at Ss. If demand shifts to Dl, the free market equili-
brium is at B since S~ is supplied under the rational expectations assump-
tion of producers’ behavior. It is only at C where the price paid by
consumers is the same
planned their output.
to be understood when
as the one expected by producers and upon which they
It is in this sense that supply stabilization has
expectations are rational.
To achieve a solution as C the government has to sell stocks, driving
the price down to Pe. Similarly, if the free market solution would have
been as F with D2, the government would buy stocks driving the price up to
Pe. If D1 and D2 are equally likely, the expected gains by consumers will
be increased by the area of ABCD-DEFG which is clearly positive. On the
other hand, it can easily be shown that the expected producers’gains are
ABDH-DHFG = O.
The effects of supply instability are more complex. While the effect






differential effect on consumers and on producers depends on the relative
size of a
1
and 61“ When ctl > f31,supply instability is beneficial for
expected consumer gains and detrimental for expected producer gains. The
opposite holds
In figure
al > 61” ‘he
for B1 > al.
7 we illustrate the effects of supply instability when
supply curve S(P*) remains constant, the random effects only
change the quantity supplied after the production decision is made. We
assume that a shift to either S1 or to Sz is equally likely. When S1 is
supplied, government buys BE of stocks driving the price up to E. This is
because E is the price which producers would have needed to produce Ss
they could adjust their production given the random disturbance which
actually occurred. Similarly
JH of stocks driving down the
expected gains are FGHI-ABCD.
if S2 is supplied, government will sell
price to J. As a result, the consumers’
Producers’expected losses are FGIJ-AEDC.
The total expected gains are BEC + GJH.
Figure 8 illustrates the effects of supply instability when 61 ~
if
‘1“




price which would induce producers to produce Ss (ifthey would be
adjust given the S1 disturbance) is smaller than the free equilibrium
Similarly with So where the price which would induce producers to
&
adjust production to S9 is higher than the free market equilibrium price.
It follows that if S, happens, government will sell EC stocks driving
the price down to C, If
the price up to G. As a
producers’expected gains
measured by BCE + GJE1.
J.
S2 happens, government will buy GJ stocks driving
result, consumers’ expected losses




















government intervention in stabilizing supplY
in either increasing price variability or decreasing it,
on the relative sizes of al and 61) we may expect either a
a surplus in government expenditures when considering a static
a; (a
such a case the expected deficit is — 1 - 131)o men
61
prices are destabilized and a deficit occurs. When f31> al,
more stable, and there will be a surplus. At any rate, as
already mentioned, it is difficult to incorporate any clear ideas about
government costs without knowing the equilibrium path of prices and quantities.
Once again we derive the variance of the changes in government stocks
as:




This variance is related to the expected social benefits as follows:
(50) EG(Ss) = ~ U2(SS)
1
Summary
Considering only the expected social gains and abstracting from
budgetary considerations, the following can be easily shown:
EG(Ss) & EG(PS) > EG(DS)
(b) If al < 2$1
EG(PS) > EG(SS) > EG(D~)
If we assume that the changes in government stocks are normally
distributed, it will be necessary to hold 1.96 times the variance of-33-
stocks in every period to achieve a given stabilizing target 95% of the
time. The storage costs involved will be ranked in the same order as the
expected gains from the different stabilizing schemes. This follows from
the proportionality relation between expected social costs and the variance
of the change in government stocks. We therefore conclude that:
C&) ~ U2(PS) > u2(Ds)
#(Ps) > 02(ss) > a2(Ds).
v. Stabilization Schemes When Foreign Demand is Unstable
Our previous results may be easily extended to cover situations in which
foreign trade may add an additional source of instability to prices and
quantities in the internal market. Hueth and Shmitz analyzed the welfare
implications of a price stabilization scheme when foreign markets are un-
stable and when internal supply reacts instantaneously to a change in price. [81
In this section the welfare implications of the different stabilizing
schemes will be analyzed when foreign markets are unstable and when supply
either reacts instantaneously to a change in price or reacts to a change in
rational expectations. In all cases, it will be assumed that the demand
for exports is inelastic. This assumption facilitates the introduction of
instability in the foreign markets market without depriving generality from




where ~. = expected level of exports at time t (known ahead of time)
L
‘t = random
It will be assumed
component of exports.
that e+ is independently distributed of Ut and Vt and
we assume that the country
of supply.
L
that its variance is finite at a: . In addition,
facing this fluctuating demand is the only source
Supply Reacts Instantaneously to Price
The basic model becomes
D(Pt) = a - alPt + Ut o
(51) s(Pt) = ~o + ~lpt + ‘t
D(Pt) + Xt = S(l?t).
The free market solutions of domestic consumption, world price and
supply are
(52)




(53) o 0+ (it) + ‘t
‘E= al+kll al + $1 al + $1
aofll + a B 10+ @l fll(ut + Et) + alvt
(54) ‘E= a1+131 (it) +
al+ 61 al + ~1
BY assumption, all sources of instability are independent. Since we have
already dealt with demand and supply instability and since these effects-35-
are additive we may now focus attention on export instability while
abstracting from any other source of instability.
We shall presently show that for all the stabilizing schemes analyzed
in this paper (stabilizingprices, stabilizing domestic consumption and
stabilizing production), export instability has the same effect. This can




Namely, the barred variables, which are the expected values of the
endogeneous variables, are the levels at which these variables are stabilized.
Let (D + ~), be as likely to happen as (D -t- ~)o. If price is stabilized,
A









that if (D + ~)1 occurs, government will
.L
drive the price down to
be at E and production,
to (D + ;)~, government
&
settle at F. Notice that at ~, domestic
F. At the stabilized
at ~. Similarly,
will buy AC stocks
consumption and
production remain at ~ and ~ respectively.
When production is stabilized, it is set at ~. If a random shift to
(D +~)1 happens, production can be brought back to ~ only if market price
is made to decline to P. This will be achieved after government sells AB
stocks. Domestic demand settles at E. By the same token, if the random
shift is towards (D + =)2, supply will be increased to ~ only if the price
is raised to ~. This will be achieved if government buys AC stocks. Again












When domestic consumption is stabilized, its level is set at ~. By
the same procedure as outlined above, domestic consumption will be stabilized
at ~ only if the price is ~ and supply is ~. This will be achieved only if
government will counteract by either selling Allstocks or
We therefore conclude that when exports are unstable




on the expected gains of producers and domestic consumers.
In terms of the graphical analysis the expected gains in consumer
welfare is negative and measured by the area of
expected gains in producers surplus is negative
AIGD-AEJI.
HIJK-FGIH. Similarly, the
and measured by the area of
It can be shown that for all the stabilizing schemes analyzed, the
expected gains of producers, domestic consumers and for the stabilizing









We conclude that in the face of export instability (when exports are
the only source of instability in the system) no stabilizing scheme will
improve social welfare. This result stems from the fact that when exports
are unstable, all stabilizing schemes will be detrimental to domestic
consumers as well as to domestic producers. That export instability is-37-
detrimental to producers gains is no surprise since all sources of demand
instability are detrimental to these gains. The reason that domestic con-
sumers will also suffer from any stabilization scheme when exports are
unstable stems from the fact that by stabilization the gains obtained by
avoiding higher prices is smaller than the loss derived from not being able
to buy at the lower prices.
Clearly, if we include the welfare effects of stabilization on the
importing country, the above results will change. Returning to the graph
in figure 9, it can be seen that in this broader case, the expected consumer
gains (domesticand abroad) become positive and are measured by the area of
GDIB-ICEJ. Expected producer gains do not change. Analytically, it can be
shown that the total expected gains (domestic and abroad) from stabilization
policies at home becomes
(59) EGT = 1 (J2
2(a1+ @l) E
We find that in total, the world as a whole benefits from any stabili-
zation scheme in a single exporting nation when exports demand is unstable.
The difference between the world expected gains and the domestic expected
gains are the expected gains which the importing country derives from .
stabilizing the domestic market
(60) EGT - EG
This expected benefit





can be shown to be equal to the expected savings in













On the other hand, when the internal market is stabilized, the expected
outlay becomes








are the additional expected import
stabilized. As such it represents
outlays when the domestic market is not
expected savings to the importing country
due to market stabilization at home.
These results indicate some of the trade policy issues which become
relevant when stabilization schemes are considered. For example, the export
nation might wish to eliminate the source of export instability by contracting
in advance with foreign countries the amounts which they will import. This
might require the administration of some kind of a buffer stock scheme in
the importing countries. Alternatively, if importing countries are not
willing to contract in advance, the exporter might stipulate export quotas
in advance. If no quotas or advanced contracting are possible, the-39-
domestic market may be stabilized and importing countries may be levied
~2
v an amount equal to l This result will be beneficial to the exporter
al + 81
and lead to free market behavior in world markets.
Finally, since export instability identically affects the expected
welfare gains derived from each of the stabilization schemes, its occurance
does not affect the relative ranking of the schemes in terms of welfare
gains or storage costs.
. Supply Determined By Rational Expectations
Following the earlier formulation of ration expectations, the model now
becomes
D(Pt) = a - alPt +Ut
o
(65) s(Pt) = ‘o + ‘lP: ‘Vt
D(Pt) + Xt =




(66) p:= 0 0 + 1
(it)
al+ 61 al + ~1










0+ ‘E= al+fll — (it) + t
al+ $1 al-40-
As with the previous case, export instability in the presence of
rational expectations identically affects the expected welfare gains derived
from each of the stabilization schemes. Its occurance therefore does not
affect the relative ranking of the schemes in terms of welfare gains or
storage costs.
Just as in the previous case, it can be shown that export instability
has the same effects on all the stabilization schemes analyzed.
Notice that if the only source of instability is in exports, the previous
graphical analysis carries over to the present model with the difference
that supply becomes completely inelastic at its expected equilibrium level.
This implies that, in the absence of any other source of instability, export




it can be shown that
EG = 1 -—02
2a1 c
stabilization policies at home when exports are unstable
become a burden only on domestic consumers. This result stems from the
fact that, by stabilizing the internal market, the gains derived from avoid-
ing higher prices are smaller than the losses
to buy at the lower prices.
Following the same procedure as outlined
derived from not being able
in the previous section it
can be shown that stabilization by the exporter brings about expected savings
0:
in outlays by importers equal.to — These are the gains which the
al “
importing country obtains from stabilization by the exporter.-41-
VI. Summary
This paper has presented analysis of welfare implications of the
deliberate stabilization of either consumption or production and then
compared those results with the already-knownwelfare implications of
stabilized prices. Two sets of assumptions regarding supply behavior
were considered, and unstable export demand also was added to the
plausible, but abstract, theoretical models.
The ordinal welfare ranking of these three schemes depends upon the
relative size of the demand and supply price response coefficients. In
most cases, price stabilization is intermediate in its welfare implica-
tions between consumption stabilization or production stabilization. To
the extent that the relative costs of operating various stabilization schemes
are directly related to the variance in government stocks associated with
them, the ordinal ranking from high to low on welfare grounds is the same
as the ordinal ranking of high to low on cost grounds.REFERENCES
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